

An Experimental Survey Study of Types and Expectations of Violence in Kosovo

ENGAGEMENT IN FOREIGN WARS, NATIONALIST RIOTS, AND VIOLENT PROTESTS

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Executive summary

This report presents an analysis of what triggers the society in Kosovo to expect individuals to engage in three different types of violence, namely participation in (i) foreign wars; (ii) nationalist-based riots; and (iii) social-based violent protests. It adds to the existing knowledge base by analysing very different types of violent behaviour and not, as has been common, only one type of violence. The report's unique finding is that there is a common factor – individuals' frustration – that triggers the society to expect them to engage in all three aforementioned types of violence. The analysis also shows that societal expectations about violence can, to a large extent, suggest that frustration is a driver of actual engagement in the three types of violent behaviours.

The analysis is based on an experimental survey conducted in Kosovo during February and March 2020 with a representative sample of 3,005 respondents. Of these, 2,405 include Kosovo Albanians, and 600 include Kosovo Serbs throughout Kosovo's municipalities. Among some standard questions, the survey has confronted respondents with stories of violence and has tested three widely accepted factors that are commonly associated with individuals' engagement in violence. These include: (i) frustrated ambitions – conceived as a mismatch between education achievement and involvement in the workforce; (ii) alienation – conceived as one's detachment from the community/society; and (iii) peer-influence – conceived as an influence that a close relative has on an individual's decision to engage in violence.

The least expected type of violence, among both Albanians and Serbs, was the participation of an individual in a foreign conflict, be that in Syria (for Albanians) or Ukraine (for Serbs). Individual's engagement in both nationalist-based riots as well as in social-based violent protests were the most expected types of violence, among both Albanians and Serbs.

When the respondents were confronted with stories in which an individual was engaged in different types of violence, the individual's frustrated ambitions were the only factor that consistently triggered the respondents to expect engagement in all different types of violence under analysis. An individual being alienated or influenced by a close peer to engage in violence was not seen as a consistent factor in triggering respondents' expectations for an individual to engage in the three investigated types of violence. These two factors mattered, but they depended on the context (the type of violence) and the ethnic background of the respondents.

The report's findings point to the role of frustrated aspirations in triggering extremism. Put differently, people who are believed to be at the highest risks of engaging in violence are educated individuals who, nevertheless, fail to achieve a satisfactory occupational position conforming with their superior levels of education. These individuals are characterized by above-average talent and ambition. They have also invested considerable resources (time and effort) in obtaining their degree. Yet, despite their high qualifications, the lack of adequate jobs for university graduates prevents many of them from pursuing satisfactory professional careers. The results of this study suggest that frustrated expectations of these educated individuals are widely associated with higher expectations of engagement in extremist violence."

Findings in this report have some important immediate and long-term policy implications and recommendations. From the immediate perspective, the findings coincide with consequences that Covid-19 is having on the job market for the general workforce and especially the highly educated. As a result of job loss in the aftermath of Covid-19, there would be an increased number of frustrated individuals, leading to potential increase in different types of violence, as in many countries of the world in 2020. In this respect, the report gives a range of recommendations with a particular focus on preventing the highly educated strata of the society being jobless for prolonged periods. It also recommends actions to be taken to urgently develop precise registries of the affected industries by the pandemic, including the affected demographics (i.e., among others, levels of education) in these industries. Jobs of the most affected industries must be protected and guaranteed during periods of lockdown.

Introduction and background

What factors drive a society to expect individuals to engage in different types of violent behaviour? What can factors that trigger society's expectations for violence tell us about the actual drivers of violent behaviour in a country? The main purpose of this report is to address these questions about individuals' engagement in different types of violent behaviour in Kosovo. Different types of violence which the report focuses on include participation in (i) foreign war; (ii) nationalist-based riots – violence which is committed on nationalist grounds against others who belong to a different ethnic group; and (iii) social-based violent protests – violence committed during bursts of protests that usually occur against the ruling elite for reasons of corruption or general dissatisfaction with living standards.

The focus on the aforementioned types of violence in Kosovo is warranted for three reasons. First, the report attempts to augment the existing knowledge on individuals' participation in a foreign war, with more insights on other understudied types of violence that the country has seen. Second, Kosovo provides a great opportunity to study different types of violence, for the knowledge generated from this case study can be generalizable for other violence-prone contexts. This is because the report tackles the questions about different types of violence by studying individuals that share different cultural, religious, and ethnic backgrounds – namely Albanians and Serbs. Third, the findings from this report can point at certain policy implications that would make efforts to reduce the possibility of engagement in different types of violent behaviour more effective. Such findings and recommendations are even more important in the context of secondary impact of Covid-19 that is increasing existing socio-economic vulnerabilities of marginalized communities and eroding social cohesion globally.

As already alluded to, no shortage of research exists on the drivers of religious extremism and the emergence of foreign fighter phenomenon in the Western Balkans. Within its CSSF funded Extremism Research project, the British Council has produced in-depth country reports for all six Western Balkan countries and accompanying policy briefs. Underpinning this research were two sets of comprehensive reviews of literature which brought to the fore key insights and

findings of research undertaken by many scholars and experts in the past years on the topic.¹ These research endeavours and attention on religious extremism were warranted for at least two reasons. First, over 1,000 individuals from the region, slightly less than two-thirds of whom were men, around 15 percent of women, and over 18 percent of children, travelled to violent theatres in the Middle East between 2012 and 2017.² This phenomenon drew attention of the international community and raised serious concerns among state institutions and policymakers as well. Additionally, there were residual localised risks that increased anxieties: the consequences of foreign fighter returnees and prospects that those “left behind” in the respective home countries were paying allegiance to the Islamic State and various other foreign religious extremist groups. The research findings showed that those “left behind” without many direct links to the hierarchy of the extremist groups abroad, in fact pose a tangible threat as they are more likely to engage in violence at home than those with direct links to extremist groups’ leadership.³

However, as countries of the region took swift and urgent actions to enhance policies and legislation to prevent and fight religious extremism,⁴ less attention was being paid to other forms of extremism and violence that were manifesting in the region. Serbia has seen increasing cases of far-right nationalism and violent hooliganism during the past several years.⁵ There are more than 30 active nationalist extremist groups in Serbia with over 5,000 members altogether that have a considerably high public influence.⁶ The number and support of such groups in Serbia and in other places in the region continue to grow.⁷ Extreme forms of nationalism and the associated violence have also been part of Macedonia’s socio-political life in recent years. For example, in April 2017, a large group of nationalists stormed into the parliament building, where they physically attacked the then opposition leader, Zoran Zaev, as well as other opposition MPs who were seen bleeding while being escorted out.⁸ During 2019, Albania has seen a wave of anti-government protests, many of which turned violent. In March 2019, protesters attempted to violently enter the parliament building.⁹ A few months later, in May 2019, thousands of protesters called for government’s resignation, while using petrol bombs

¹ see Becirevic, Edina, Majda Halilovic, and Vlado Azinović. 2017. “Literature Review: Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council.

https://www.britishcouncil.rs/sites/default/files/erf_literature_review_2017_radicalisation_and_violent_extremism.pdf; Kursani, Shpend. 2019. “Literature Review (2017-2018): Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://www.britishcouncil.rs/sites/default/files/20fml20kursani_literature20review20ii20-20erf.pdf.

² Azinovic, Vlado. 2018. “Western Balkans Report.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://www.britishcouncil.rs/sites/default/files/erf_report_western_balkans_2018.pdf.

³ see Hegghammer, Thomas. 2013. “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting.” American Political Science Review 107 (01): 1–15. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000615>.

⁴ see Azinovic, Vlado, and Edina Becirevic. 2017. “A Waiting Game: Assessing and Responding to the Threat from Returning Foreign Fighters in the Western Balkans.” Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Regional Cooperation Council. <https://www.rcc.int/pubs/54/a-waiting-game-assessing-and-responding-to-the-threat-from-returning-foreign-fighters-in-the-western-balkans>.

⁵ Perry, Valery. 2019. Extremism and Violent Extremism in Serbia: 21st Century Manifestations of an Historical Challenge. ibidem Press.

⁶ Petrovic, Predrag, and Isidora Stakic. 2018. “Serbia Report.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://www.britishcouncil.rs/sites/default/files/erf_report_serbia_2018.pdf.

⁷ Ristic, Marija, Sven Milekic, Maja Zivanovic, and Denis Dzidic. 2017. “Far-Right Balkan Groups Flourish on the Net.” Resonant Voices (blog). May 5, 2017. <https://resonantvoices.info/far-right-balkan-groups-flourish-on-the-net/>; see also Radicevic, Nenad. 2019. “We Are Their Voice’: German Far-Right Builds Balkan Alliances.” Balkan Insight (blog). October 24, 2019. <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/24/we-are-their-voice-german-far-right-builds-balkan-alliances/>; Rrustemi, Arlinda. 2020. “Far-Right Trends in South Eastern Europe: The Influences of Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Albania.” The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

⁸ Euractiv. 2017. “Violence Erupts as Protesters Storm Macedonia Parliament.” Www.Euractiv.Com (blog). April 28, 2017.

<https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/violence-erupts-as-protesters-storm-macedonia-parliament/>; see also Stojkovski, Filip, and Natasia Kalajdziovski. 2018. “Community Perspectives on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Macedonia.” Country Case Study 1. Berlin/Skopje: Berghof Foundation.

⁹ TRT World. 2019. “Clashes Erupt as Protesters Try to Storm Albanian Parliament.” Clashes Erupt as Protesters Try to Storm Albanian Parliament, March 28, 2019. <https://www.trtworld.com/europe/clashes-erupt-as-protesters-try-to-storm-albanian-parliament-25348>.

aimed at Prime Minister's office.¹⁰ These are only some illustrations of the manifestation of other forms of violence in the region; they are not only isolated incidents.

Having one of the highest per capita foreign fighters in the region, Kosovo drew a considerable amount of attention among domestic and international observers. However, Kosovo has not been an outlier when it comes to other types of violence. In fact, Kosovo can arguably be said to be an excellent case to illustrate the manifestation of an array of violent behaviours. For example, some of dozens of protests that have been organized in Kosovo in the past several years, either under the banner of anti-corruption or for matters of and troubles with national/state identity, have turned violent. In January 2016, several Kosovo opposition parties organized a protest against the incumbent government at the time which escalated violently: throwing stones, Molotov cocktails, attacking the cordoning police force and setting the first few floors of the government building on fire.¹¹ Thirty individuals linked to the incident were apprehended as a result.¹²

Similarly, a few months later, and at the height of anxiety about the surging number of foreign fighters reported on a daily basis in the mainstream media, in early August of 2016, Kosovo's Parliament building was attacked by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) from not afar.¹³ Kosovo's Parliament adopted a declaration that dubbed the attack as one against "Kosovo as a state, its citizens' interests, and its political and democratic values [...]".¹⁴ The responsibility for the attack was taken by the so-called "Banorët e Rugovës (Residents of Rugova)".¹⁵ Some of their pamphlets stated that the attack on the Parliament was taken to express dissent against the possibility for Kosovo to cede parts of its territory (in the Rugova area) to Montenegro as part of the border demarcation agreement with the latter.¹⁶ It appeared that "Banorët e Rugovës" was only a cover-up to, perhaps, mislead the investigations. Some weeks after the attack, six individuals were arrested in connection to the RPG attack on the Kosovo Parliament. The border demarcation agreement with Montenegro was later successfully ratified in Kosovo's Parliament. However, the ratification was preceded by the successive use of tear gas by several MPs inside the Parliament's chamber to prevent the ratification agreement.¹⁷ Several MPs had to attend to medical care as a result.

¹⁰ EuroNews. 2019. "Albania Protests: Petrol Bombs Hurlled at Prime Minister's Office." Euro News, May 13, 2019, sec. news. <https://www.euronews.com/2019/05/12/albania-protests-continue-as-petrol-bombs-hurled-at-prime-minister-s-office>.

¹¹ Bislimi, Bekim. 2016. "Përplasje të dhunshme në Prishtinë." Radio Evropa e Lirë, January 9, 2016. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/27478197.html>. According to the Kosovo Police, these attacks were carried out by "a group of young people who used dangerous means of attacking state institutions (translated by authors from Albanian)" Ibid.

¹² Bislimi, Bekim. 2016. "Përplasje të dhunshme në Prishtinë." Radio Evropa e Lirë, January 9, 2016. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/27478197.html>.

¹³ Shehu, Bekim. 2016. "Prishtinë: incidente të dhunshme dhe zjarrvënie pas protestës së opozitës." Deutsche Welle, September 1, 2016. <https://www.dw.com/sq/prishtine-incidente-t%C3%AB-dhunshme-dhe-zjarrv%C3%ABnie-pas-protest%C3%ABs-s%C3%AB-opozit%C3%ABs/a-18969302>.

¹⁴ Vllahiu, Arbër, Arton Konushevci, and Nadie Ahmeti. 2016. "Kuvendi dënon fuqishëm sulmin ndaj tij." Radio Evropa e Lirë, August 5, 2016. <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/27900897.html>. (translated from Albanian by authors)

¹⁵ Klan Kosova. 2016. "Rugovasit Distancohen Nga Sulmi Mbi Kuvendin e Kosovës," August 5, 2016. <https://klankosova.tv/rugovasit-distancohen-nga-sulmi-mbi-kuvendin-e-kosoves/>.

¹⁶ Klan Kosova. 2016. "Rugovasit Distancohen Nga Sulmi Mbi Kuvendin e Kosovës," August 5, 2016. <https://klankosova.tv/rugovasit-distancohen-nga-sulmi-mbi-kuvendin-e-kosoves/>.

¹⁷ Shehu, Bekim. 2018. "Nën tymin e gazit lotsjellës në Kosovë ratifikohet demarkacioni me Malin e Zi." Deutsche Welle, March 21, 2018. <https://www.dw.com/sq/n%C3%ABn-tymin-e-gazit-lotsjell%C3%ABs-n%C3%AB-kosov%C3%AB-ratifikohet-demarkacioni-me-malin-e-zi/a-43074868>.

Prishtina is not the only centre in Kosovo where violent behaviour has been observed. The northern part of Kosovo has seen many agitated Serbs with the unsettled socio-political situation take violent actions against state institutions and ordinary citizens. Memories are still fresh of Kosovo border posts in the north being set on fire by a group of young northern Kosovo Serbs, be that in 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence or in 2011 when Kosovo Police attempted to take control over border crossing points in the north.¹⁸ The northern part of Kosovo has also seen violent attacks by hand grenades and other lethal methods against international institutions such as the UN or EULEX.¹⁹ Ordinary citizens of diverse ethnic groups were not spared from such attacks leading to death and injuries.²⁰

What makes people engage in such diverse types of violent behaviour as participation in a foreign conflict, nationalist-based rioting, or social-based violent protests?

A brief look at the available information of some of the perpetrators of these diverse types of violence in Kosovo brings to light a curious commonality. Unexpectedly higher than average levels of education seem to characterize most of them. All those indicted for their involvement in the RPG attack against the Kosovo Parliament building, hold levels of education far superior to the Kosovo average. Those who disrupted sessions inside the Parliament chamber in Kosovo by using violent means, such as tear gas, are highly educated. Detailed information from court cases of over 270 foreign fighters that travelled to the Middle East reveals that they are more educated than the average citizen in Kosovo of the same age-group.²¹

The above observation is puzzling because education is typically associated with more restraint in violent behaviour and a greater propensity to use words and arguments rather than fists, stones, or guns to voice concerns and grievances.²² One possible explanation of this puzzle comes from the idea of frustrated ambitions that lead to violence.²³ According to this idea, when ambitions and anticipated achievements, which usually come with superior levels of education, are not met, it can lead to frustration, which increases the tendency to justify and use violence. This explanation is consistent, for example, with the observation that popular revolutions typically erupt when a period of growing prosperity is followed by a period of sharp

¹⁸ Bilefsky, Dan. 2008. "Angry Serbs Burn Border Posts in Kosovo." The New York Times, February 20, 2008, sec. World. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/world/europe/20kosovo.html>; BIRN. 2011. "Serb 'Hooligans' Burn Kosovo-Serbia Crossing." Balkan Insight, July 27, 2011. <https://balkaninsight.com/2011/07/27/serbian-hooligans-burn-kosovo-serbia-crossing/>; BBC. 2011. Kosovo Border Post Set on Fire. <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-14320577/kosovo-serbia-border-post-set-alight>.

¹⁹ BIRN. 2008. "Explosion in Key Kosovo Flashpoint." Balkan Insight, February 17, 2008. <https://balkaninsight.com/2008/02/17/explosion-in-key-kosovo-flashpoint/>; Krstic, Branislav. 2010. "Blast Kills One, Hurts 10 in Flashpoint Kosovo Town." Reuters, July 2, 2010. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kosovo-explosion-idUKTRE6614TB20100702>; BBC. 2013. "Children Injured in Kosovo Blast." BBC News, February 4, 2013, sec. Europe. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21331797>.

²⁰ BIRN. 2008. "Explosion in Key Kosovo Flashpoint." Balkan Insight, February 17, 2008. <https://balkaninsight.com/2008/02/17/explosion-in-key-kosovo-flashpoint/>; Krstic, Branislav. 2010. "Blast Kills One, Hurts 10 in Flashpoint Kosovo Town." Reuters, July 2, 2010. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-kosovo-explosion-idUKTRE6614TB20100702>; BBC. 2013. "Children Injured in Kosovo Blast." BBC News, February 4, 2013, sec. Europe. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21331797>.

²¹ Kursani, Shpend. 2018. "Kosovo Report." Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018.pdf.

²² Annan, Jeannie, Christopher Blattman, Dyan Mazurana, and Christopher Carlson. 2011. "Civil War, Reintegration, and Gender in Northern Uganda." Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (6): 877–908. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711408013>.

²³ Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." American Sociological Review 27: 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714>; Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. https://nls.idls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100026763099.0x000001; Caruso, Raul, and Friedrich Schneider. 2011. "The Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism and Political Violence in Western Europe (1994–2007)." European Journal of Political Economy 27 (December): S37–49. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.02.003>.

economic reversal—that is, in situations in which citizens see the hope of better future and increase their aspirations accordingly only to become profoundly disappointed subsequently.²⁴

Does the resultant frustration really push individuals toward different types of violence in Kosovo? Is this what drives society's expectations for violence? Or are there other factors that drive a society to expect violence inside a country? What can factors that trigger society's expectations for violence tell us about the actual drivers of violent behaviour in a country?

To answer these questions and provide a comprehensive view on the problem of violence in Kosovo, a representative sample of the population was surveyed about their beliefs regarding the factors driving violent behaviours. The statistical analysis of over 3,000 survey responses found that frustrated ambitions are indeed associated with a substantial increase in the likelihood of expectations for violence by Kosovo citizens. This result holds true for all the different types of violence analysed here, which include (i) participation in a foreign war, (ii) nationalist-based violent riots, and (iii) social-based violent protests. Importantly, frustrated ambitions are a factor associated with increased expectations of violence among both Albanian and Serbian respondents. At the same time, no consistent evidence was found for the effects of other factors that have been highlighted as possible drivers of violence in previous reports.²⁵ Namely, those reports found that alienation (detachment from the community) and peer influence (encouragement by a close relative) may drive Kosovo citizens toward violent behaviour. This study does not fully confirm these earlier results. The effects of alienation and peer influence are strongly dependent on the type of violence studied and the ethnicity of a respondent who participated in this survey. The report also attempts to illustrate with analyses from additional survey responses that factors which trigger the society to expect violence might speak about the actual triggers of individuals' violent behaviour.

1. Rationale, contributions, and approach

As some of the illustrations in the beginning paragraphs of the report attest, religious extremism and the emergence of foreign fighters as an aftereffect are not the only forms of violent expressions that have been present in the region and Kosovo. Some of these other types of violent behaviour could even be said to have been much more frequent and lethal in the Western Balkans than religious extremism.²⁶ This is not to say that religious extremism and associated violence is less important than the other types of observed violent behaviours. Nevertheless, the wealth of resources and attention that have been directed at preventing and fighting only one type of violent behaviour (religious extremism) can be streamlined to cover and prevent a broader spectrum of violent behaviours that continue to cross our paths.

²⁴ Davies, James C. 1962. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 27: 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714>.

²⁵ For a summary, see British Council's 2019 Literature Review in Kursani, Shpend. 2019. "Literature Review (2017-2018): Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans." Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://www.britishcouncil.rs/sites/default/files/20fml20kursani_literature20review20ii20-20erf.pdf.

²⁶ see Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS's) counts of violence by type covering a period of close to 10 years in Kosovo in Kursani, Shpend. 2017. "Kosovo Risk Assessment Report Since Independence: February 2018 - June 2017." Prishtina, Kosovo: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. <http://www.qkss.org/en/Reports/Kosovo-Risk-Assessment-Report-since-independence-February-2008-June-2017-1012>.

It is difficult to be comfortable with any prediction that suggests that all that has been observed from different types of violence in the region, and especially in Kosovo, is a forgotten past. Foreign fighters will continue to play an outsized role in future conflicts. Various conflict zones “will remain a magnet for foreign fighters, both veterans of previous conflicts like Syria, but also newer recruits that missed their opportunity or were too young to participate”.²⁷ Furthermore, Kosovo has recently re-entered the negotiations process with Serbia. This process has previously triggered harsh discourses and frequent threats of use of violence from political parties to ordinary citizens. These negotiations, in general, carry sensitive issues for Albanians’ and Serbs’ overall national and state identities. Borders and territory, which have been speculated to be a part of these negotiations, had proven to be heated topics before, which triggered violence in different periods. Some of these mounting controversies between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo relate to the long-standing ethnic conflict that goes back to the 1998-9 war and the violence in March 2004. At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on countries’ overall revenues and spending. While the pandemic has mostly hit those already in aggravated conditions, it is likely to impact also the educated and employed.²⁸ Recently, Kosovo’s government reported that more than 50 percent of enterprises were shut as a result of the pandemic, and predicted that negative effects in the economy would be felt over the coming year as well.²⁹ Thus, increased frustration in the society in the near future cannot be ruled out when it comes to expectations about social-based violent behaviour or other types of violent behaviour.

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Additionally, this study contributes by covering a significant gap in our current knowledge about drivers of very different types of violence. Specifically, it provides standardized and thus directly comparable evidence on the likely drivers of religious, ethnic, and social violence. Much has been said about the causes of violence. Religious extremism, for example, has been attributed to individuals’ exposure to radical networks,³⁰ such as Hijazi pan-Islamist communities.³¹ Violent protests in turn have been linked to both violent repression of protesters³² as well as low risks of

²⁷ Noonan, Michael P., Colin P. Clarke, Barak Mendelsohn, R. Kim Cragin, and David Malet. 2019. “The Future of the Foreign Fighters Problem.” Foreign Policy Research Institute (blog). 2019. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/11/roundtable-the-future-of-the-foreign-fighters-problem/>. n.p.

²⁸ GAP. 2020. “The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on the Kosovo Budget.” Prishtina: GAP Institute. <https://www.institutigap.org/news/2571>.

²⁹ Koha.net. 2020. “Hoti pret përgjysmimin e rasteve me COVID-19 brenda 2 javësh.” KOHA.net, July 18, 2020, sec. Arbëri. <https://www.koha.net/arberi/229922/hoti-pret-pergjysmimin-e-rasteve-me-covid-19-brenda-2-javesh/>; Indeksonline.net. 2020. “Hoti Njofton Se Rreth 56% e Ndërmarrjeve Janë Mbyllur Gjatë Pandemisë.” Indeksonline.Net, July 18, 2020. <https://indeksonline.net/hoti-njofton-se-rreth-56-e-ndermarrjeve-jane-mbyllur-gjate-pandemise1/>.

³⁰ Rink, Anselm, and Kunaal Sharma. 2018. “The Determinants of Religious Radicalization: Evidence from Kenya.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (6): 1229–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716678986>.

³¹ Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” International Security 35 (3): 53–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/SEC_a_00023.

³² Kritzer, Herbert M. 1977. “Political Protest and Political Violence: A Nonrecursive Causal Model.” Social Forces 55 (3): 630–40. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/55.3.630>.

such persecution.³³ Regarding ethnic violence, Scacco³⁴ and Schaub³⁵ have found that mobilisation for ethnic riots may be triggered by the fear of competing groups' aggression (rather than their willingness to attack themselves). Civil war scholars, by contrast, have underscored rivalry and revenge cycles³⁶ as well as a host of greed and grievances motivations³⁷ as likely causes of wartime violence.

Most of these studies, however, focus on determinants of violent behaviour of a single type, offering only case-specific explanations, resulting in a multitude of competing and oftentimes not well-connected theories. But can we explain engagement in very different types of violent behaviours with the same explanatory factors? The literature is divided. On the one hand, Van Hiel³⁸ argues that different types of violent behaviours are caused by distinct factors, pointing to pronounced differences between left-wing and right-wing extremism, for instance. Others, by contrast, note that different types of violent behaviours may also share some common causes. Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath, for example, find a strong relationship between the extent of civil conflict in a soccer players' home country and their propensity to behave violently on the soccer field.³⁹ Humphreys and Weinstein, in turn, demonstrate that grievance-based accounts of participation in a civil war—which emphasize the role of poverty and political exclusion—predict participation in both rebellion and counter-rebellion.⁴⁰ This is consistent with the claim that some factors make people more likely to fight as such, irrespective of what they fight for or against whom.

The present report adjudicates between these conflicting interpretations by studying societal perceptions of factors that most likely drive people's engagement in violence across a variety of violent behaviours. The report additionally takes advantage to report the analysis from the research and findings in Kosovo – a case where different types of violence have been observed. Kosovo offers a great opportunity to potentially generalize the findings to other contexts across the world. This is because different types of violence in Kosovo have been observed among diverse ethnic groups that speak different languages, have very different religious identities and cultural backgrounds. Similar behaviours rarely co-occur in the same setting, while being perpetrated by individuals with different ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The findings from the current study are thus informative for a broader phenomenon of violence around the world, especially in the contexts where violent behaviours are diffuse and take many different forms.

³³ Kalyvas, Andreas. 2010. "An Anomaly? Some Reflections on the Greek December 2008." *Constellations* 17 (2): 351–65. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2010.00597.x>.

³⁴ Scacco, Alexandra. 2009. "Who Riots? Explaining Individual Participation in Ethnic Violence." New York, N.Y.: Columbia University.

³⁵ Schaub, Max. 2017. "Second-Order Ethnic Diversity: The Spatial Pattern of Diversity, Competition and Cooperation in Africa." *Political Geography* 59 (July): 103–16. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.01.006>.

³⁶ Balcells, Laia. 2017. *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.

³⁷ Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 436–55. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00322.x>; Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2013. "Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3): 659–72.

³⁸ Hiel, Alain Van. 2012. "A Psycho-Political Profile of Party Activists and Left-Wing and Right-Wing Extremists." *European Journal of Political Research* 51 (2): 166–203. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01991.x>.

³⁹ Miguel, Edward, Sebastián M. Saiegh, and Shanker Satyanath. 2011. "Civil War Exposure and Violence." *Economics & Politics* 23 (1): 59–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2010.00372.x>.

⁴⁰ Humphreys, Macartan, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 436–55. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00322.x>.

... findings from the current study are [...] informative for a broader phenomenon of violence around the world, especially in the contexts where violent behaviours are diffuse and take many different forms.

Lastly, a focus on societal expectations of violence sets this study apart from previous reports on violence in Kosovo for three reasons. First, in a setting where different types of violence have occurred and are well-known phenomena, local expectations for the types of violent behaviour under present analysis may provide us with insights into true determinants of actual violent behaviours.⁴¹ Second, local expectations/beliefs may also reflect individuals' justifications of engagement in violent behaviours.⁴² Research has found that people are more likely to believe that a factor provokes socially undesirable behaviours (such as violence) if they recognize this issue as a legitimate societal grievance. Otherwise, socially undesired behaviour is downplayed to the doings of antisocial behaviour.⁴³ Local expectations of violence may thus tap onto actual societal support for violence, pointing to policy interventions that are likely to garner popular approval. Third, by focusing the study on local expectations for violence, instead of directly confronting respondents about whether they support one or another type of violence, "social desirability" bias that affects standard measures of actual violent behaviours was avoided.⁴⁴ The survey enumerators approached respondents with questions and stories about violence, which experimentally, in a controlled manner, attempted to find the factors triggering expectations for violent behaviour.

2. What factors are likely to lead to different types of violence?

This study focuses its analysis on three factors that are more likely to lead individuals to engage in different types of violence. These include (i) frustrated ambitions; (ii) alienation; and (iii) peer influence. These three factors are isolated as the most likely ones from the broader literature dealing with a range of violent behaviours, as well as from findings that are offered in a range of studies in the Western Balkans and Kosovo.

The first factor that is likely to explain engagement in different types of violence in Kosovo is the idea of **frustrated ambitions**, which proposes that violence is a product of a gap between

⁴¹ Kremer, Ilan, Yishay Mansour, and Motty Perry. 2014. "Implementing the 'Wisdom of the Crowd.'" *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (5): 988–1012. <https://doi.org/10.1086/676597>.

⁴² Schmid, Alex P. 2014. "Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" Research Paper. The Hague: The International Center for Counter-Terrorism; Hauenstein, Neil M. A., Kevin M. Bradley, Patrick Gavan O'Shea, Yashna J. Shah, and Douglas P. Magill. 2017. "Interactions between Motivation to Fake and Personality Item Characteristics: Clarifying the Process." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 138 (January): 74–92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.11.002>.

⁴³ Masullo, Juan, and Davide Morisi. 2020. "Brazil's Fight Against Drug Syndicates. Assessing Support for Conditional Security Policies." Unpublished manuscript.

⁴⁴ King, Maryon F., and Gordon C. Bruner. 2000. "Social Desirability Bias: A Neglected Aspect of Validity Testing." *Psychology & Marketing* 17 (2): 79–103. [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(SICI\)1520-6793\(200002\)17:2<79::AID-MAR2>3.0.CO;2-0](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6793(200002)17:2<79::AID-MAR2>3.0.CO;2-0).

expectations and social realities.⁴⁵ According to this argument, individuals engage in violent behaviours due to “a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality”.⁴⁶ Some indications for this factor became obvious already from the initial observations discussed in the opening paragraphs of the report.

The frustrated ambitions argument also finds support in a recent scholarship on terrorism. In the context of religious extremism, Gambetta and Hertog find that the lack of opportunities for highly qualified engineers in Middle-East Muslim countries explains why this educational group is over-represented among known jihadists around the world.⁴⁷ In line with this reasoning, Lee shows that members of violent separatist groups in Bengal tend to come from “lower-status individuals from the educated and politicized section of the population.”⁴⁸ She argues that both low-status uneducated individuals and high-status educated individuals are less likely to engage in violence because they do not experience a gap between expectations and realities. The former does not have very high aspirations, while the latter is typically able to realize their ambitions.⁴⁹

The second factor that could explain engagement in a range of violent behaviours, also in Kosovo, is **social alienation**.⁵⁰ Researchers typically define social alienation as dissatisfaction with modernization, which brings generational shifts, and related mismatch between long-established conservative values and increasingly liberal customs. Huntington describes the dislocation of traditional social institutions through the processes of urbanization and the spread of popular education as common sources of alienation that may culminate in violence.⁵¹ Consistent with this argument, Piazza finds that measures of societal revolutions—such as the increase in abortion rates and growing female participation in the labour force—correlate with right-wing terrorist attacks in the U.S.⁵² More generally, Meierrieks and Krieger document that the modernizing countries—in which traditional customs are likely to be disappearing—have a higher probability of experiencing Islamist extremism and violent conflict than both fully developed and largely underdeveloped countries.⁵³

Micro-level evidence is also consistent with the alienation argument. Botha, for example, shows that Al-Shabaab’s successful recruitment of militants among ethnic Somalis in Kenya can be

⁴⁵ Davies, James C. 1962. “Toward a Theory of Revolution.” *American Sociological Review* 27: 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714>; Caruso, Raul, and Friedrich Schneider. 2011. “The Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism and Political Violence in Western Europe (1994–2007).” *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (December): S37–49. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eipoleco.2011.02.003>.

⁴⁶ Davies, James C. 1962. “Toward a Theory of Revolution.” *American Sociological Review* 27: 5–19. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714>, p.6

⁴⁷ Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. 2018. *Engineers of Jihad the Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

⁴⁸ Lee, Alexander. 2011. “Who Becomes a Terrorist?: Poverty, Education, and the Origins of Political Violence.” *World Politics* 63 (2): 203–45. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887111000013>, p.206

⁴⁹ This extends a classical account according to which low education and low status per se explain violent extremism e.g. Shabani, Samet, and Amir Kadri. 2018. “Working Towards Resilient Communities.” Skopje, Macedonia: Analytica Thinking Laboratory; Stojkovski, Filip, and Natasia Kalajdziovski. 2018. “Community Perspectives on the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Macedonia.” Country Case Study 1. Berlin/Skopje: Berghof Foundation.

⁵⁰ Huntington, Samuel P. 1973. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Botha, Anneli. 2014.

“Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council.”

<https://issafrica.org/amp/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council>; Piazza, James A. 2017. “The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA: Economic Grievance, Societal Change and Political Resentment.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34 (1): 52–80. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215570429>.

⁵¹ Huntington, Samuel P. 1973. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

⁵² Piazza, James A. 2017. “The Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA: Economic Grievance, Societal Change and Political Resentment.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34 (1): 52–80. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215570429>.

⁵³ Meierrieks, Daniel, and Tim Krieger. 2015. “Modernization and Islamist Conflict.” Conference paper. *Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie Und Politik - Session: Trade, Migration, Conflicts*, No. C09-V3. German Economic Association. See also Hegghammer, Thomas. 2010. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” *International Security* 35 (3): 53–94. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023.

explained by their perception that the Islamic customs are threatened by the predominantly Catholic community.⁵⁴ Research from Western Balkans concurs with these findings showing that groups at risk of radicalization are “young people, mainly in their twenties and thirties who attempt to prove themselves in search for their identity”.⁵⁵ This observation is also confirmed by Rink and Sharma who find that troubled social relations, including the lack of respect among peers and conflicts with parents, correlate with higher scores on the radicalization index in Kenya.⁵⁶

The third factor that could explain involvement in different violent behaviours in Kosovo and beyond is **peer influence**. According to this idea, people are more likely to engage in violence if they see other people around them do the same. To illustrate, Scacco shows that participants of ethnic riots in Nigeria are typically dragged into fighting by their close friends, neighbours, and relatives.⁵⁷ It is also a well-established fact in the behavioural science that individuals involved in illegal political behaviour increase their peers’ levels of illegal political behaviour.⁵⁸ This is also illustrated by Botha, who finds that “peers—especially friends—played a very prominent role in guiding respondents to al-Shabaab, while respondents in turn also recruited other friends.”⁵⁹ Importantly, the peer network effects apply not only to behaviours but can extend to beliefs and attitudes—including religious radicalism, for instance.⁶⁰

Consistent with the above findings, the British Council report on violent extremism in Kosovo finds that “close bonds between the younger generation of close and extended family members significantly facilitates individuals’ attraction to violent groups”.⁶¹ Studying a sample of over 90 foreign fighters in Kosovo, the study finds that 70 percent of individuals were linked to each other through either close or extended family ties. A remarkable 40 percent of them are tied through close family ties, i.e., nuclear family ties, including siblings, spouses, and parents/children. This is unsurprising, given that engaging in collective violence, either domestically (nationalist rioting), or internationally (participation in foreign wars), requires trust among individuals, which may explain why close-knit family ties seem to play a prominent role in the recruitment into violent groups.

With these factors in mind, the following section analyses the effect that each of these factors can have on societal expectations for different types of violent behaviour. To do so, it starts by

⁵⁴ Botha, Anneli. 2014. “Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council.”

<https://issafrica.org/amp/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council>.

⁵⁵ Kursani, Shpend. 2019. “Literature Review (2017-2018): Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council.

https://www.britishcouncil.rs/sites/default/files/20fnl20kursani_literature20review20ii20-20erf.pdf, p.9; see also Petrovic, Predrag, and Florian Qehaja. 2017. “Violent Extremism: Beyond Foreign Fighters and behind Numbers.” 36. Resilience in the Western Balkans. European Union Institute for Security Studies. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/resilience-western-balkans>; Stojanovic-Gajic, Sonja. 2018. “Security Issues in the Western Balkans.” Civil Society Forum Series 05. Western Balkans Summit. <http://wb-csf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/CSF-PB-05-Security-Issues-in-the-Western-Balkans-1.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Rink, Anselm, and Kunaal Sharma. 2018. “The Determinants of Religious Radicalization: Evidence from Kenya.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (6): 1229–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716678986>.

⁵⁷ Scacco, Alexandra. 2009. “Who Riots? Explaining Individual Participation in Ethnic Violence.” New York, N.Y.: Columbia University.

⁵⁸ e.g. Dahl, Viktor, and Maarten van Zalk. 2014. “Peer Networks and the Development of Illegal Political Behavior Among Adolescents.” Journal of Research on Adolescence 24 (2): 399–409. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jora.12072>.

⁵⁹ Botha, Anneli. 2014. “Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council.”

<https://issafrica.org/amp/research/papers/radicalisation-in-kenya-recruitment-to-al-shabaab-and-the-mombasa-republican-council>, p.915

⁶⁰ Rink, Anselm, and Kunaal Sharma. 2018. “The Determinants of Religious Radicalization: Evidence from Kenya.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (6): 1229–61. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716678986>.

⁶¹ Kursani, Shpend. 2018. “Kosovo Report.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018.pdf, p. 32

briefly describing the novel experimental approach that is employed to more realistically capture (in a manner to reduce social desirability bias) which of these factors trigger society's expectations for different types of violence (see Appendix A.2 for more details).

3. Frustration, alienation, peer influence: triggers of expectations for different types of violence?

To capture respondents' beliefs about the type of violence they expect most and the factors which are more likely to trigger their heightened expectations for different types of violence, the survey was carried out on 3,005 citizens of Kosovo, in line with the British Council Research and Evaluation Ethics policy. The survey data collection was carried out by a survey company⁶² between February 9, 2020, to March 5, 2020, throughout Kosovo municipalities, with a representative sample of sub-populations. The survey was based on a household survey methodology. Respondents were interviewed through a face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviewing technique (CAPI). The CAPI approach has enabled this research to, in particular, arrange questions and then experimentally manipulate factors under analysis (see further below). The margin of error for the general sample is 1.78 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.

Of the 3,005 interviewed citizens in Kosovo, 2,405 (80 percent) were Albanian, and 600 (20 percent) were Serbs. Both groups constitute about 90 and 5 percent of the Kosovo population, respectively.⁶³ Those that were interviewed constitute a representative sample of the population older than 18 years of age from both ethnic groups. The Serbian sample was purposefully oversampled equally split between Serbs from the South and the North. This was done to have enough Serb respondents that would allow more confident judgments to be made in the analysis of the beliefs of this ethnic group. All respondents were interviewed at home in their native language by co-ethnic interviewers.

Among many standard survey questions that all 3,005 interviewees were asked, they were additionally confronted with stories about a hypothetical individual's participation in violence.⁶⁴ There are two components worth highlighting about the stories the respondents were confronted with. First, every respondent was confronted with three stories of violence, each involving an individual who participated in (i) a foreign war; (ii) a nationalist-based riot; and (iii) a social-based violent protest. Stories about individuals' participation in these three types of

⁶² British Council commissioned "UBO Consulting" from Kosovo to carry out the survey.

⁶³ The 2011 census data estimates the size of the Albanian population at the level of 92.9 percent and the Serbian population at the level of 1.5 percent. Yet, these estimates under-represent the true Serbian population because northern Kosovo (which is a Serb-dominated area) was excluded from the 2011 census. Moreover, the census was also partially boycotted by Serbs in southern Kosovo. See RFE/RL. 2011. "Kosovar Extends Census; Serbs Boycott." RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, April 16, 2011. https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo_extends_census_serbs_boycott/4746086.html.

⁶⁴ Respondents' beliefs about the likely determinants of violence by implementing a novel experimental protocol were measured. Specifically, multiple-stories (vignette) experiment was used to gauge what factors trigger certain type of responses in a controlled manner. See Auspurg, Katrin, and Thomas Hinz. 2014. Factorial Survey Experiments. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

violence were carefully designed for both the Albanian and the Serbian sample. Stories were about their co-ethnics' involvement in violence. Namely, to capture respondents' beliefs about participation in a foreign conflict, Albanian respondents were confronted with a story about, for example Faik⁶⁵ who, in 2015, went to Syria to participate in an armed conflict. Similarly, Serb respondents were confronted with a story about Bojan) who, in 2015, went to Ukraine to participate in the armed conflict. The same logic was followed for stories involving the other types of violence.

Second, and importantly, each of the stories about violence the respondents were confronted with, included additional information about the individual featuring in the story (i.e., about Faik – for the Albanian sample, or Bojan – for the Serbian sample). The additional information in the story included three factors that have been discussed in the previous section. For example, a respondent was confronted with conflict stories in which Faik/Bojan was educated, but without a job for many years, portraying thus these individuals as being frustrated. Another respondent was confronted with the same story, but one in which now Faik/Bojan was educated with a well-paid job, portraying thus these individuals as not being frustrated. These were all randomly manipulated on the electronic questionnaire (tablet), which the enumerators used during the interviews.

In sum, stories of violence which respondents were confronted with, and enabled by the CAPI approach, featured individuals who:

- were well-educated **without** or **with** a job, meaning **frustrated** or not
- felt **detached from** or **part of** the community, meaning **alienated** or not
- were encouraged by a **next to kin** or **new acquaintance**, meaning **peer influence** or not

Table 1 summarizes the stories about the three types of violence that each of the 3,005 respondents were confronted with. Text in bold represents the factors that were randomly manipulated, as described in the above bullet points. The order which they appear in the text was also randomly manipulated in that the first factor illustrated in Table 1 below was a part of the second or last sentence, and so on.

Lastly, after being confronted with each of the above three stories about violence, respondents were asked about the level to which they expected the featured individual in the story to have participated in the described violent behaviour. As such, respondents were asked: “given these circumstances [described in the story], what do you think of Faik’s/Bojan’s decision to join the violent event (i.e., participate in violent conflict, ethnic riot, or violent protest against corruption)? Respondents had a chance to pick from one of the following five available answer choices: (1) completely expected; (2) somewhat expected; (3) neither expected nor unexpected; (4) somewhat unexpected; and (5) completely unexpected.

⁶⁵ Names of individuals featuring in violent stories were different and randomly assigned for both Albanians and Serbs

Next, the study moves to present the initial findings of society's overall expectation of three types of violence based on the stories they were confronted with. Then the analysis continues by presenting the most likely factors which triggered respondents' heightened expectations for an individual to engage in each type of violence.

Table 1. Stories of different types of violence presented to each respondent according to ethnicity

STORY	...FOR THE ALBANIAN RESPONDENTS	...FOR THE SERBIAN RESPONDENTS
Foreign conflict	<i>I will tell you a story about Faik who in 2015 went to Syria to participate in the armed conflict. What we know is that Faik had a university degree, but couldn't find a job for many years [or] and had a well-paid job. We also know that, at the time, Faik was very detached from [or] attached to the community. And what we also know is that it was Faik's brother [or] a person that Faik recently had met online who encouraged him to go to Syria.</i>	<i>I will tell you a story about Bojan who in 2015 decided to go to Ukraine to support the Russian rebels. What we know is that Bojan had a university degree but couldn't find a job for many years [or] and had a well-paid job. We also know that, at the time, Bojan was very detached from [or] attached to the community. And what we also know is that it was Bojan's brother [or] a person that Bojan recently had met online who encouraged him to go to Ukraine.</i>
Nationalist-based violence	<i>The other situation is about Vigan who in 2014 participated in a violent riot against the Serbs at the Mitrovica bridge. What we know is that Vigan was an educated lawyer, but couldn't find a stable job for many years [or] and was working in a law office. We also know that, at the time, Vigan was very detached from [or] attached to the community. And what we also know is that it was Vigan's brother [or] a person that Vigan recently had met online who encouraged him to join the riots.</i>	<i>The other situation is about Lazar who in 2014 participated in a violent riot against the Albanians at the Mitrovica bridge. What we know is that Lazar was an educated lawyer, but couldn't find a stable job for many years [or] and was working in a law office. We also know that, at the time, Lazar was very detached from [or] attached to the community. And what we also know is that it was Lazar's brother [or] a person that Lazar recently had met online who encouraged him to join the riots.</i>
Social-based violence	<i>And, the last situation is about Fidan who in 2016 participated in a violent protest in Prishtina against corruption. What we know is that Fidan was an educated economist, working in a parking lot [or] working in a bank. We also know that, at the time, Fidan was very detached from [or] attached to the community. And what we also know is that it was Fidan's brother [or] a person that Fidan recently had met online who encouraged him to join this protest</i>	<i>And, the last situation is about Darko who in 2019 participated in a violent protest in Strpce against the building project of the hydro plant. What we know is that Darko was an educated economist, working in a parking lot [or] working in a bank. We also know that, at the time, Darko was very detached from [or] attached to the community. And what we also know is that it was Darko's brother [or] a person that Darko recently had met online who encouraged him to join this protest</i>

3.1. Society's general expectations for different types of violence


According to respondents' answers about the level to which they expected an individual in the story to have engaged in violence, around a quarter of respondents expected (completely or to some extent) for an individual to engage in all types of violence. Breaking this finding down to specific types of violence, four patterns can be highlighted:

- The least expected type of violence among Kosovo respondents of both ethnic groups was the participation of an individual in the foreign conflict.
- Less than a quarter of the respondents (24 percent) expected (completely or to some extent) the individual described to them in the violence story to have decided to participate in a foreign conflict.
- Half of the respondents (50 percent) did not expect (completely or to some extent) for the same individual to have participated in the described foreign conflict (Syria for Albanian sample, Ukraine for Serb sample).
- Individual's participation in a foreign conflict as the least expected type of violence among both ethnic groups is not a surprise. Both Albanians and Serbs, in reality, lived much longer through other types of violence. The emergence of foreign fighters was only a recent phenomenon in their respective societies.

The least expected type of violence among Kosovo respondents of both ethnic groups was participation of an individual in the foreign conflict.


The most expected type of violence by the respondents was the individual's participation in a nationalist-based riot and social-based violent protest. Almost a third of the respondents (29 percent) expected (completely or to some extent) for the said individual to have decided to join these two types of violence. Figure 1 summarizes this discussion

Figure 1. Given the circumstances [described in the story] of [name of the individual featuring in the story], what do you think of his decision to join the violent event in [one of the three types of violence described in the story]? Entire Kosovo sample.



The analysis of overall expectations of violent behaviour based on ethnic breakdown shows that a larger share of Albanian respondents expected an individual to have engaged in each type of violence presented to them than the Serb respondents. As summarized in Figure 2, the Albanian respondents have had slightly higher expectations about the individual's engagement in social-based violence than other types of violence. The Serb respondents have had higher expectations about the individual engaging in nationalist-based violence than other types of violence. The expectation of the individual engaging in the foreign conflict was the lowest expected type of violence among both ethnic groups when compared to other types of violence.

Figure 2. Given the circumstances [described in the story] of [name of the individual featuring in the story], what do you think of his decision to join the violent event in [one of the three types of violence described in story]? Ethnic breakdown.



But what explains the variation between those that expected and those that did not expect individuals to engage in each type of violence? In other words, what factors have triggered respondents the most to expect an individual to have participated in each type of violence? Did they expect the individual to engage in violence when he was portrayed as frustrated, alienated, or when he was influenced by a close peer? The following paragraphs provide answers to these questions

3.2. Frustration: a trigger for society's expectations for diverse violent behaviours


From the statistical analysis, this study finds frustration to be associated with increased expectations of all three types of violence. Albanian characters in the violence stories who were described as holding a university degree and were not able to find a job were assessed as 16 percentage points more likely to have participated in a foreign war, 20 percentage points more likely to have participated in a nationalist-based riot, and 21 percentage points more likely to have participated in a social-based violent protest than educated characters having well-paid employment. These differences were smaller for respondents assessing Serbian characters in the violence stories. Among Serbian subjects, frustration was associated with 18 percentage points higher expectations of participation in a foreign war, 14 percentage points higher expectations of participation in a nationalist-based riot, and 20 percentage points higher expectations of participation in social-based violent protest. These results suggest, therefore, that being frustrated is a common factor in triggering society's expectations for an individual to engage in all three types of violent behaviours. At the same time, what is interesting to note is that being frustrated is a factor that more strongly triggers the society to expect social-based violence than the other two types of violence among both Albanians and Serbs.

...being frustrated is a common factor to trigger society's expectations for an individual to engage in all three types of violent behaviours

Figure 3 presents more comprehensively how each manipulated factor in the violence stories that respondents were confronted with triggered their expectations about individual's likelihood to engage in different types of violence. By contrast, Figure 3 also suggests that there is no consistent evidence for the effects of other factors in respondents' expectations for violence. Alienation is associated with higher likelihood of participation in a foreign war in Ukraine among Serbian respondents. Yet, alienation does not affect other types of violence, nor participation in a foreign war among Albanian respondents. Another interesting suggestion that comes from the analysis of empirical evidence is that alienation has almost no effect whatsoever in triggering society's expectations for nationalist-based violence. Such a finding for this type of violence is not a surprise. After all, being alienated (detached from the community) would make it hard for an individual to engage in nationalist-based violence, which requires strong social and community attachment to national identity. In sum, the analysis provides inconclusive and context-dependent support for alienation and peer influence as factors that trigger expectations for violent behaviour. Importantly, all these findings remain consistent regardless of the respondents' gender, age, education, occupation, income, and religiosity.

... the analysis provides inconclusive and context-dependent support for alienation and peer influence as factors may trigger expectations for violent behaviour

Figure 3. Effects of frustration, alienation, and peer influence in triggering expectations of different types of violence




3.3. Do society's expectations for violence speak about actual violence?

Now that we find that being in a frustrated position is a factor that triggers society's expectations for an individual to engage in different types of violence, can we say that frustration is a factor that predicts an individual's propensity for actual violence? To begin with, this finding does not attempt to suggest that every frustrated individual will engage in violence. What it attempts to assert is that that being in a frustrated position is more likely (between 14 to 21 percentage points, depending on the ethnic group) to lead an individual towards violence of different types than not being frustrated. Furthermore, additional information that has been gathered from the respondents during the survey interviews give additional credence to the finding that frustration is a strong predictor for actual violence.

First, the questionnaire has captured the respondents' actual level of religious and nationalist fundamentalism. To obtain respondents' level of religious fundamentalism, they were presented with statements about different aspects of religion to which they had to respond by choosing one of the five-scale answer choices (from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree").⁶⁶

Respondents' answers to these statements were combined into a single measurement of religious fundamentalism, which ranks them on a five scale level from very high to very low religious fundamentalism. Interestingly, the survey respondents' stated expectations about an individual's engagement in foreign conflict strongly correlate to their actual level of religious fundamentalism. Figure 4 shows that more than 50 percent of the respondents who expected the individual in the violence story to participate in a foreign conflict, have themselves held high religious fundamentalist views. Only 17 of the respondents with such expectations had low or no religious fundamentalist views themselves.

Figure 4. Respondents' expectations for the individual described in the story to engage in foreign conflict, and respondents' own religious fundamentalist attitudes.




⁶⁶ The statements about religion included the following:

1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "It is more important to belong to Islam [for Muslim sample] / Christianity [for Christian sample] than to be a good person."
2. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Violence against civilians is justified when fighting for Islam [for Muslim sample] / Christianity [for Christian sample]."
3. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Islam [for Muslim sample] / Christianity [for Christian sample] is superior to other religions."
4. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "There is only one correct interpretation of the [Quran / Bible]."

The same trend is also found in the relationship between respondents' expectations for nationalist-based violence and their actual level of nationalist fundamentalism. For consistency purposes, respondents' level of nationalist fundamentalism has been obtained identically as their level of religious fundamentalism. They were presented with statements about different aspects of the nation to which they had to respond by choosing one of the five-scale answer choices (from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree").⁶⁷ Respondents' answers to these statements were combined into a single measurement of nationalist fundamentalism, which ranks them on a five scale level from very high to very low nationalist fundamentalism. The survey respondents' stated expectations about an individual's engagement in nationalist-based violence strongly correlate to their actual level of nationalist fundamentalism. Figure 5 presents this relationship.

Figure 5. Respondents' expectations for the individual described in the story to engage in nationalist-based conflict, and respondents' own nationalist fundamentalist attitudes



Second, from the survey data gathered for this study, the report presents the geographic distribution of the actual frustrated individuals (with university degrees, but without employment) and otherwise (with university degree and employment). Figure 6 shows these shares for all Kosovo municipalities. Consistent with the expectations of our analysis, it was found that the highest shares of frustration are observed in many of the areas that are known for the prevalence of different types of violence. For example, among the frustrated population from the Albanian sample, Kacanik is a municipality that hosts the largest share (on municipal level) of individuals with a university degree, but with no employment. In more recent years, Kacanik has been dubbed by many writing international journalists as Kosovo's "jihadist capital" or "Islamist cauldron."⁶⁸ No recorded violence has been committed inside Kacanik. However, Kacanik came

⁶⁷ The statements about the nation included the following:

1. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "It is more important to belong to the Albanian [for Albanian sample] / Serbian [for Serbian sample] nation than to be a good person."
2. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Violence against civilians is justified when fighting for the Albanian [for Albanians sample] / Serbian [for Serbian sample] nation."
3. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "The Albanian [for Albanian sample] / Serbian [for Serbian sample] nation is superior to other nations."
4. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "There is only one correct interpretation of the Albanian [for Albanian sample] / Serbian [for Serbian sample] history."

⁶⁸ Freeman, Colin. 2015. "Inside Kacanik, Kosovo's Jihadist Capital," August 23, 2015, sec. World.

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/11818659/Inside-Kacanik-Kosovos-jihadist-capital.html>.; Bezhan, Frud. 2016. "Inside Kosovo's Islamist Cauldron," June 2016. <http://www.rferl.org/fullinfoGraphics/infoGraphics/inside-kosovos-islamic-cauldron/27825148.html>.

to “host” the greatest number of foreign fighters, on per capita basis, who had travelled to join the violent conflict in the Middle East. Kacanik is also where Kosovo’s most notorious religious extremist and foreign fighter, Lavdrim Muhaxheri, came from.

... the highest shares of frustration are observed in many of the areas that are known for the prevalence of different types of violence

The finding and discussion about Kacanik hosting a score of people in a frustrated position and its effect on the emergence of violence is consistent also with the British Council’s earlier report on violent extremism in Kosovo.⁶⁹ Analysing the profiles of over 270 foreign fighters, the report suggests that foreign fighters emerging from Kosovo tend to be more educated than the average Kosovo citizen of the same age. What is interesting to note from this report, however, is that foreign fighters were more likely to report unsatisfactory employment conditions, i.e., working in such temporary jobs as waitering, parking attendant, barber, car wash, and alike – suggesting unmet ambitions of more educated people. This is another piece of qualitative evidence, which suggests that frustrated ambitions might have played a role in these people’s decision to engage in religious extremism in Syria and Iraq.

Furthermore, it was found that areas characterized by a greater prevalence of frustration in the highly educated population coincide with municipalities anecdotally associated with elevated levels of inter-ethnic retaliations. The map for the Albanian sample in Figure 6, shows Gjakova as another municipality that hosts a score of highly educated people who are unemployed. Gjakova used to be economically developed and a source of political power in Kosovo during Yugoslavia. Many of the highest-ranked Kosovo leadership at the time came from Gjakova, whose residents enjoyed higher status and prestige when compared to many other areas, especially rural and non-Western parts of Kosovo.⁷⁰ Their prestigious position was reflected in higher educational achievements as well as absorbing socialist state investments. Yet, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Gjakova region experienced a sharp decline in prosperity.

Areas characterized by a greater prevalence of frustration in the highly educated population coincide with municipalities anecdotally associated with elevated levels of inter-ethnic retaliations


The growing joblessness and the decline in hopes for resurgent prosperity in the near future pushed many of Gjakova’s young residents to seek education and employment in Prishtina. Prishtina citizens often ironically say that their city has the most educated waiters in the world—referring to Gjakovars, who usually have completed the university or higher degrees but work as waiters. This is of course impossible to prove quantitatively. Many students and those who have completed their higher education degrees from other cities also find “refuge” in waitressing jobs. However, the above irony that Prishtina citizens often utter about the Gjakovars is illustrious of the overall condition and the findings of this report.

⁶⁹ see Kursani, Shpend. 2018. “Kosovo Report.” Policy Report. Extremism Research Forum. London, UK: British Council. https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018.pdf.


⁷⁰ Ströhle, Isabel. 2016. “Of Social Inequalities in a Socialist Society: The Creation of Rural Underclass in Yugoslav Kosovo.” In *Special Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav Socialism*, edited by Rory Archer, Igor Duda, and Paul Stubbs, 112–31. Oxon: Routledge.

Figure 6. The prevalence of individuals in a frustrated position in each Kosovo municipality, ethnic breakdown.

ALBANIAN SAMPLE



SERBIAN SAMPLE



Unsurprisingly, frustrated Gjakova residents are often the ones that continue to stand out, compared to residents of other areas, especially those nearby, when it comes to clashes with ethnic background. Serbs' most important religious sites are located in different parts of Kosovo, where not many Serbs remained since the 1998-9 war. After the war and, partly due to conflict memories, Kosovo Albanians tended to, at times, react violently when Serbs visit their religious sites in different parts of Kosovo. However, there is a significant variation in this unwelcoming reaction. For example, when Serbs visit their monastery in the municipality of Decan or Skenderaj, their visits are met with less or no backlash from local Albanians. However, violent clashes against the Serbs who return to or visit these sites, including clashes with the local police, are a recurring event in the municipality of Gjakova. This is particularly the case that occurs almost every year. Displaced Serbs from Gjakova attempt to visit their cemeteries or their religious shrines in the city, but their buses often get stoned by the local Albanian population.⁷¹ For example, a quick scan of the US Department of State's regular reports on International Religious Freedom between 2015 and 2019, the above-mentioned reactions and incidents in Gjakova are consistently reported.⁷² Consistent in these reports is the lack of any violent incidents in the nearby monastery in the Decani municipality or the municipality of Skenderaj, for example.⁷³ One could credibly argue that it can perhaps be the diverse locations of Serb monasteries in these respective municipalities that may explain the variation in citizens' reactions.⁷⁴ This certainly can be, if not alternative, an added explanation to the findings of this study. The report's findings do not speak in absolute terms; the significant effect size of frustrated ambitions on citizenry's violent reactions certainly gives room to other explanations having an effect on the same outcome. Be that as it may, given the limitations on data with regards to how the geolocation of these monasteries may impact citizens' reaction the above example complements their quantitative findings.

While these clashes are partly rooted in the suffering of Gjakovars during the 1998-9 war, it is worth noting that the municipalities of Decan and Skenderaj suffered comparable war damage and victimization during that conflict. The survey has gathered data on the respondents' experience during different periods of conflict, where they were asked about losses in human lives or property damages they have suffered. According to the summary, which is presented in Appendix A.1, indeed, respondents in Decan reported having suffered more damages from the Serb forces during the war than the respondents from Gjakova who suffered equally as those from Skenderaj. Yet violent inter-ethnic incidents in Decan or Skenderaj, when Serbs attempt to

⁷¹ Novosti. 2018. "Dzakovica: Kamenovani autobusi sa Srbima." NOVOSTI, June 11, 2018.

<https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:333899-Djakovica-Kamenovani-autobusi-sa-Srbima>.

⁷² see U.S. Department of State. 2015. "2015 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo."

<https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/884806/download>; U.S. Department of State. 2016. "2016 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo."

<https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>; U.S. Department of State. 2017. "2017 Report on

International Religious Freedom: Kosovo." <https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>; U.S.

Department of State. 2018. "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo." [https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-](https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/)

[international-religious-freedom/kosovo/](https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/); U.S. Department of State. 2019. "2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo."

<https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>.

⁷³ see U.S. Department of State. 2015. "2015 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo."

<https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/884806/download>; U.S. Department of State. 2016. "2016 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo."

<https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>; U.S. Department of State. 2017. "2017 Report on

International Religious Freedom: Kosovo." <https://www.state.gov/reports/2017-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>; U.S.

Department of State. 2018. "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo." [https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-](https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/)

[international-religious-freedom/kosovo/](https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/); U.S. Department of State. 2019. "2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kosovo."

<https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-report-on-international-religious-freedom/kosovo/>.

⁷⁴ The Monastery in Gjakova is positioned more inside the city than in Decan or Skenderaj.

visit their religious sights in these municipalities, do not occur – or at least not to the extent that they occur in Gjakova.

It is worth noting that after the war, the municipalities of Decan and Skenderaj emerged as small but important centres of the new post-war political power and have integrated their populations into emerging post-war political structures. Many members of present-day Kosovo elites come from these small municipalities. The regions have thus benefited from economic opportunities that their residents' participation in political structures brought. Gjakovars, by contrast, have never managed to rebuild the prosperity they had during Yugoslavia. Therefore, the analysis and findings would suggest that the frustrated position in which many Gjakovars find themselves would explain, to a large extent, their higher propensity to engage in politically motivated violence against ethnic outgroups today.⁷⁵

Lastly, the map for the Serbian sample in the earlier Figure 6, appears to show that, on average, the northern Serb municipalities house more frustrated individuals than almost all southern Serb municipalities. This, likewise, coincides with the evidence that exists on the ground. When Serbs incited violence against the Albanians, it was in the north, and seldom, in the south. Furthermore, no evidence exists suggesting that Serbs from southern Kosovo travelled as foreign fighters to Ukraine to fight on the side of the pro-Russian rebels. All the suggestions, as speculative as they may have been, point at the possibility that if Serbs from Kosovo left to Ukraine, it was those from the north.⁷⁶ One exception from the claim about Kosovo northern Serb municipalities is that the southern Serb municipality of Strpce shows the highest level of educated people without employment. Are Strpce's residents more likely to engage in violence than the residents of the northern Serb municipalities? It is difficult to give a definite conclusion. However, the analysis presented in this report would assert that tendencies for violence in Strpce do exist, but this does not necessarily mean inter-ethnic violence. Some Strpce residents, for example, have recently shown to be ready to resist, even if it takes clashing with the police, against the building of a hydro plant. They even have done this often together with Albanians living in the same area.⁷⁷ Much like with the Albanian sample, previous victimization is unrelated to this geographic distribution of individuals with frustrated ambitions among the Serb sample. As Appendix A.1. shows, the most victimized Serb population have been those in the south-eastern municipalities of Kosovo where the rate of individuals with frustrated ambitions are the lowest among this sample population.

... additional evidence demonstrates that that what triggers society's expectations for different types of violence may speak also about the actual tendencies for violent behaviour

⁷⁵ Two additional tests on the validity of their results are described in detail in the Appendix. Specifically, in the Appendix A.2, it is argued that the wider societal views shed light on actual behaviors thanks to the notion of the "wisdom of crowds". Four assumptions of the wisdom of crowds' logic are discussed and demonstrated that they are met in this study. Next, in the Appendix A.3, report correlations between respondents' justification of violence and their own frustration, alienation, and violent peer networks are reported. The positive effect of frustration is confirmed in this supplementary analysis, which taps directly onto subjects' propensity to violence.

⁷⁶ Sukhankin, Sergey. 2019. "Foreign Mercenaries, Irregulars and 'Volunteers': Non-Russians in Russia's Wars." The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/foreign-mercenaries-irregulars-and-volunteers-non-russians-in-russias-wars/>.

⁷⁷ see Majkovci, Fitim. 2019. "Protesta e radhës kundër hidrocentraleve në Shtërpce u mbajt nën vëzhgimin e njëjësive speciale të Policisë." KOHA.net, October 1, 2019, sec. Kosovë. <https://www.koha.net/kosove/186844/protesta-e-radhes-kunder-hidrocentraleve-ne-shterpce-u-mbajt-nen-vezhgimin-e-njesive-speciale-te-policise/>.

This additional evidence demonstrates that what triggers society's expectations for different types of violence may also speak about the actual tendencies for violent behaviour.

Conclusions and policy implications

This report has analysed societal beliefs on what triggers citizens to expect different types of violence to occur. Its four main findings are as follows. First, the survey respondents associate the perpetrator's frustrated ambitions—measured as a mismatch between educational achievement and labour market outcomes—with a higher likelihood of engaging in violent behaviour. Second, the effect of frustration is observed for both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. Third, frustration is associated with higher expectations of violence across three very different types of violent behaviours: (i) participation in a foreign war, (ii) nationalist-based riot, and (iii) social-based violent protest. Fourth, there is no consistent evidence to support the previous findings from Kosovo reports suggesting that violence in the country is driven by alienation and peer influence. These factors undoubtedly matter for engagement in violent behaviours but only for certain types of violence and among certain respondents. Frustration, therefore, is a unique finding of this report in that it is a common predictor of individuals' engagement across different types of violence.

These findings offer some important policy implications. Some of these implications could be said to be more immediate. First, an expected job loss related to the global Covid-19 pandemic may lead to rising levels of frustration in the population. Some writers from McKinsey's Public and Social Sector have recently suggested that Covid-19 "could be one of the biggest destroyers of jobs in human history."⁷⁸ They further continue to state that "when people are stripped of their work, they suffer losses not just of income but also of dignity, meaning, and hope."⁷⁹ This frustration, in turn, can be very likely catalysed into different types of violence.

Re-emergence of foreign fighter phenomenon due to Covid-19 is a non-starter. This is because violent theatres where individuals can join have shrunk. New "opportunities" for engagement in a foreign war, at least in the immediate future seem unlikely. However, the potential increase of frustrated individuals due to the impact of Covid-19 on the economy and job market can signal the possibility of engagement in social-based violence and/or nationalist-based violence. Governments should thus take measures aimed at protecting highly educated/qualified individuals from losing their jobs. This is particularly important, given that some of these high-skilled jobs are frequently not considered to be essential to society's survival during a pandemic and therefore, can be neglected by policymakers. What could be done as a matter of policy

⁷⁸ Fine, David, Julia Klier, Deepa Mahajan, Nico Raabe, Jörg Schubert, Navjot Singh, and Seckin Ungur. 2020. "Saving and Recreating Employment during COVID-19." McKinsey & Company (blog). April 15, 2020. <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/how-to-rebuild-and-reimagine-jobs-amid-the-coronavirus-crisis#>. n.p.

⁷⁹ Fine, David, Julia Klier, Deepa Mahajan, Nico Raabe, Jörg Schubert, Navjot Singh, and Seckin Ungur. 2020. "Saving and Recreating Employment during COVID-19." McKinsey & Company (blog). April 15, 2020. <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/how-to-rebuild-and-reimagine-jobs-amid-the-coronavirus-crisis#>. n.p.

design and planning, at least, is to devise policies that do not hold highly educated strata of the society jobless for a prolonged period.

This report does not suggest that policies should, as a matter of normative judgment, focus only on the educated people in general. The potential losses from Covid-19 are more likely to affect those who can least afford it. A recent report by the International Labour Organization (ILO) warns that among most affected by the lockdowns due to the pandemic are those engaged in the informal economy.⁸⁰ The lockdowns especially will impact the earnings of those involved in the informal economy.⁸¹ However, for those concerned with the likelihood for individuals to engage in different types of violent behaviour in the near future, a focus on highly educated and jobless people would be a good priority, among others. In this respect, the Government of Kosovo, and others in the region, could develop registries with most affected industries by lockdowns and associated demographic profiles of employees in these industries. Such registries can and should be used by governments to target the most affected industries and workers. Subsequently, those whose jobs are most affected should be protected and guaranteed in the times of lockdown, including the highly educated. A future research endeavour could additionally tackle the issue beyond simply (un)education and jobs; i.e. a focus on income deprivation regardless of (not) having a job while (un)educated could provide further nuanced findings.

Second, the findings also offer recommendations for current de-radicalization programs in Kosovo and around the world. These programs are typically characterized by a very narrow focus, limited to interventions against religious extremism or post-war reconciliation efforts.⁸² Additionally, many programs aimed at deradicalizing and integrating religious extremists have and are being tried. Yet, it remains unknown what works and what does not.⁸³ Our results suggest that a more fruitful approach would include addressing the wider spectrum of violence. Focusing on how to minimize the mismatch between the ambitions created by over-education and the inability of the labour market to absorb these ambitions would tackle the problem of different types of violence and not only one. For example, by focusing on the immediate problems brought by the pandemic, governments can develop specialized and subsidized programs to offer “smart solutions” technologically (engineers), legally (lawyers), economically (economists), and health-wise (physicians) to fight and prevent the pandemic, on the one hand, while keeping people of these profiles at work, on the other. The same approach can also be used outside the context of the pandemic. For example, similar specialized programs can be created by governments to engage the newly highly educated individuals in major public investment programs.

⁸⁰ ILO. 2020. “ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work. Third Edition Updated Estimates and Analysis.” International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_743146.pdf.

⁸¹ ILO. 2020. “ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work. Third Edition Updated Estimates and Analysis.” International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_743146.pdf.

⁸² see Cilliers, Jacobus, Oeindrila Dube, and Bilal Siddiqi. 2016. “Reconciling after Civil Conflict Increases Social Capital but Decreases Individual Well-Being.” *Science* 352 (6287): 787–94. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aad9682>; Scacco, Alexandra, and Shana S. Warren. 2018. “Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria.” *American Political Science Review* 112 (3): 654–77. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000151>.

⁸³ Schuurman, Bart, and Liesbeth Heide. 2016. “Foreign Fighter Returnees & the Reintegration Challenge.” RAN Issue Paper. RAN Centre of Excellence.

International community and international organizations can also promote voices of highly educated youth in addressing the secondary impact of Covid-19. The British Council is currently piloting Science for Engagement programme across the Western Balkans. This programme aims to strengthen the voice of educated youth to better advocate for their needs in the Covid-19 recovery efforts across the region by creating a pool of young scientist and researchers, highly capable of translating scientific evidence into policy ideas and effectively engage with policy makers. Through this programme undergraduate, graduate, and PhD students are provided with an opportunity to use their scientific knowledge to develop innovative technological and policy solutions to tackle the challenges posed by the current pandemic.

Third, and relatedly, one could also draw implications for the “over-education” problem, which is common in many so-called “post-Soviet” countries,⁸⁴ including Kosovo and other countries in the Western Balkans. Even in the OECD countries, Borghans and de Grip find that large numbers of highly educated workers are trapped in jobs with low educational requirements.⁸⁵ The authors interpret this finding as an evidence that societies overinvest in schooling. This is worrisome because prior research has shown that working below one’s skill level correlates with lower productivity and less job satisfaction.⁸⁶ It may also increase the likelihood of depression and negatively affect psychological well-being.⁸⁷ The present study adds to this debate by highlighting another potential negative consequence of overinvestment in schooling, namely its possible effects on generating violence.

In line with the above findings, available evidence from the Western Balkans suggests that the rising levels of educational attainment in these countries are indeed not met with a demand for qualified labour.⁸⁸ This study can assert that this process may generate frustration and resultant spikes in violence. One way to address this problem could include promotion and de-stigmatization of educational pathways other than tertiary education. At the moment, any educational choice other than a university degree is seen as a failure or a signal of “not being smart enough.” For example, Karanovic and Karanovic show that tertiary education is thus frequently chosen because of its social and psychological importance, rather than future financial benefits of holding a degree.⁸⁹ It is recommended that efforts are made to tackle these potentially harmful perceptions.

Additionally, in the long-term perspective, the acquisition of professional skills should be given higher value and appreciation, especially by state institutions. This can be done by (i) providing

⁸⁴ Kiersztyn, Anna. 2013. “Stuck in a Mismatch? The Persistence of Overeducation during Twenty Years of the Post-Communist Transition in Poland.” *Economics of Education Review* 32 (February): 78–91. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2012.09.009>.

⁸⁵ Borghans, Lex, and Andrias de Grip. 2000. *The Overeducated Worker?: The Economics of Skill Utilization*. Cheltenham: E. Elgar.

⁸⁶ see Belfield, Clive. 2010. “Over-Education: What Influence Does the Workplace Have?” *Economics of Education Review* 29 (2): 236–45; Peiró, José M., Sonia Agut, and Rosa Grau. 2010. “The Relationship between Overeducation and Job Satisfaction among Young Spanish Workers: The Role of Salary, Contract of Employment, and Work Experience.” *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 40 (3): 666–89. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2010.00592.x>.

⁸⁷ Dooley, D., J. Prause, and K. A. Ham-Rowbottom. 2000. “Underemployment and Depression: Longitudinal Relationships.” *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 41 (4): 421–36; Friedland, Daniel S., and Richard H. Price. 2003. “Underemployment: Consequences for the Health and Well-Being of Workers.” *American Journal of Community Psychology* 32 (1–2): 33–45. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025638705649>.

⁸⁸ see Karanovic, Bisera, and Goran Karanovic. 2015. “Is There an Education Bubble in the Western Balkans?” *Procedia Economics and Finance, The Economies of Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the Changed World (EBEEC 2014)*, 19 (January): 248–60. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671\(15\)00026-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(15)00026-X).

⁸⁹ Karanovic, Bisera, and Goran Karanovic. 2015. “Is There an Education Bubble in the Western Balkans?” *Procedia Economics and Finance, The Economies of Balkan and Eastern Europe Countries in the Changed World (EBEEC 2014)*, 19 (January): 248–60. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671\(15\)00026-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(15)00026-X), p. 259.

vocational training for immediate skill-acquisition, (ii) officially certifying acquisition of such skills and make them valuable for the immediate job market; (iii) increasing awareness among the society that such pathways are attractive and valuable to pursue. In an environment like Kosovo, but also in many other developing countries, where being “over-educated” not necessarily means being “over-skilled,” higher rates of overeducation are not healthy for the overall mid-term economic growth of countries themselves.⁹⁰ Therefore, there are multi-faceted benefits from focusing on skills – one important one, for this study, being the potential reduction on the incidence of different types of violent behaviour.

⁹⁰ Vichet, Sam. 2018. “Overeducation among Graduates in Developing Countries: What Impact on Economic Growth?” No. 87674. Munich, Germany: Royal University of Law and Economics.



Appendixes

A.1. Victimization in Kosovo

Figure 7 (a). Level of victimization during 1998/1999 conflict or Spring 2004 riots, Albanian sample





Figure 8 (b). Level of victimization during 1998/1999 conflict or Spring 2004 riots, Serbian sample



A.2. Reducing “social desirability” bias

Although the analyses rely on perceptions of what triggers violence, the survey showed that these perceptions are informative about the correlates of actual behaviours. This follows from the wisdom of crowds’ logic, which posits that an aggregation of imperfect individual judgments results in excellent collective knowledge.⁹¹ The wisdom of crowds has proved useful in identifying and measuring hidden behaviours, such as political activism⁹² or anti-regime protest.⁹³

There are two major advantages of this method compared to directly interviewing perpetrators of violence. First is a possibility of experimental manipulations that create random variation in factors hypothesized as conducive to violence. This allows to causally identify the studied effects. The second advantage is a reduction in the so-called “social desirability” bias.⁹⁴ Most individuals engaging in violence are aware that violent behaviours are generally condemned. They may thus try to justify these behaviours post-hoc.⁹⁵ For example, perpetrators of violence may deny their own agency in violent acts, portraying engagement in violence as a product of social circumstances beyond their control. Our measurement circumvents this problem: Assessing the likelihood of other people’s violent behaviour in hypothetical situations is sufficiently neutral not to trigger self-censored responses.

The applicability of the wisdom of crowds’ logic to this case, however, hinges on four partially testable assumptions. They include: a) diversity of opinions, b) independence of individual judgements, c) decentralization of knowledge, and d) some aggregation mechanism. Once these assumptions are met, a collective judgement that we measure is likely to be accurate due to a mathematical truism summarized as follows:

“If you ask a large enough group of diverse, independent people to make a prediction or estimate a probability, and then average those estimates, the errors each of them makes in coming up with an answer will cancel themselves out. Each person's guess, you might say, has two components: information and error. Subtract the error, and you're left with the information”⁹⁶

Below, it is argued that the above assumptions are likely to hold in this case. First, the survey was conducted on a random sample of population including individuals from different age groups, with different levels of education, and professing different religions. The resultant diversity of opinions is well documented in the descriptive statistics in Tables 2 and 3. Second,

⁹¹ Surowiecki, James. 2005. *The Wisdom of Crowd*. New York: Anchor.

⁹² Hager, Anselm, Lukas Hensel, Johannes Hermle, and Christopher Roth. n.d. “Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment.” Bonn, Germany: Institute of Labor Economics. Accessed July 16, 2020. <https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/12759/political-activists-as-free-riders-evidence-from-a-natural-field-experiment>.

⁹³ Cantoni, Davide, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y. Jane Zhang. 2019. “Protests as Strategic Games: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong’s Antiauthoritarian Movement.” 100316. LSE Research Online Documents on Economics. LSE Research Online Documents on Economics. London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/100316.html>.

⁹⁴ King, Maryon F., and Gordon C. Bruner. 2000. “Social Desirability Bias: A Neglected Aspect of Validity Testing.” *Psychology & Marketing* 17 (2): 79–103. [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(SICI\)1520-6793\(200002\)17:2<79::AID-MAR2>3.0.CO;2-0](https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6793(200002)17:2<79::AID-MAR2>3.0.CO;2-0).

⁹⁵ Tan, Lavinia, and Randolph C. Grace. 2008. “Social Desirability and Sexual Offenders: A Review.” *Sexual Abuse*, March. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063208314820>.

⁹⁶ Surowiecki, James. 2005. *The Wisdom of Crowd*. New York: Anchor. p. 10

subjects were interviewed in private and did not receive any information about how other people had responded to the same questions, making respondents' judgements independent from each other. Third, thanks to standardized format of the questionnaire, we were able to aggregate individual responses and focus on average tendencies. Fourth and last, respondents were sampled from all Kosovo municipalities. Some subjects lived close to the hotpots of different types of violence (e.g. Mitrovica for ethnic violence, or Kacanik for religious extremism). Others, by contrast, resided in the areas where violence was almost absent. Moreover, people from two different ethnic groups were sampled who are exposed to different political discourses and different news media narratives. This alleviates concern that subjects drew from some common sources of knowledge about violence.

While the localized knowledge assumption is essentially untestable, its plausibility is further tested through a series of sub-sample analyses. First, respondents interviewed in areas of Kosovo where specific types of violence had actually occurred were identified and their responses compared to subjects interviewed in violence-free areas. The latter respondents had less knowledge about why other people might have engaged in violence. It is thus expected to find no statistically significant correlations between factors manipulated in the vignettes and the measured outcomes among these individuals. This expectation is firmly confirmed in Tables 4 and 5, which lends credence to key wisdom of crowds' assumption.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics (Albanian sample)

	MEAN	SD	MIN.	MAX.	N
Foreign war	2.531	1.275	1	5	2405
Ethnic violence	2.751	1.238	1	5	2405
Violent protest	2.763	1.265	1	5	2405
Violence for Islam	2.224	1.465	1	5	1221
Religion trumps humanity	2.751	1.535	1	5	1168
Violence for the nation	2.346	1.432	1	5	1241
Nation trumps humanity	2.534	1.433	1	5	1216

Table 3. Descriptive statistics (Serbian sample)

	MEAN	SD	MIN.	MAX.	N
Foreign war	2.237	1.023	1	5	600
Ethnic violence	2.645	0.970	1	5	600
Violent protest	2.552	0.910	1	5	600
Violence for Christianity	2.244	1.163	1	5	299
Religion trumps humanity	2.376	1.182	1	5	311
Violence for the nation	2.210	1.028	1	5	291
Nation trumps humanity	2.306	1.085	1	5	333

Table 4. Determinants of participation in foreign war—foreign fighters (Albanians)

	(1) FOREIGN WAR	(2) FOREIGN WAR
Frustration	0.224 (0.297)	0.202*** (0.053)
Alienation	-0.321 (0.296)	-0.016 (0.053)

Peer Influence	-0.216 (0.300)	0.049 (0.053)
Foreign fighters	No	Yes
R-squared	0.029	0.007
N	71	2334

Notes: The table reports correlation coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions of the expectations of violence on the perpetrator's characteristics. The analysis is divided between respondents interviewed in municipalities with at least one "foreign fighter" (column 1) and municipalities without "foreign fighters" (column 1). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Determinants of participation in foreign war—distance to Serbs (Albanians)

	(1) ETHNIC WAR	(2) ETHNIC WAR	(3) ETHNIC WAR	(4) ETHNIC WAR
Frustration	0.293*** (0.074)	0.220* (0.114)	0.055 (0.137)	-0.007 (0.227)
Alienation	0.080 (0.074)	0.121 (0.114)	-0.117 (0.138)	-0.023 (0.228)
Peer Influence	0.031 (0.074)	-0.067 (0.114)	0.240* (0.138)	0.308 (0.229)
Closest Serbs (distance)	0-5 km	5-10 km	10-15 km	15-20 km
R-squared	0.015	0.012	0.012	0.014
N	1083	434	310	131

Notes: The table reports correlation coefficients and standard errors of linear regressions of the expectations of violence on the perpetrator's characteristics. The analysis is conducted on sub-samples divided according to respondents' distance to the closest Serbian enclave. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The qualitative fieldwork also confirms that population in Kosovo relies on localized knowledge about violence and there was evidence showing that people know a lot about each other in their communities.

A.3. Expectations and justifications of violence

Table 6 shows that respondents' own frustration is associated with stronger agreement with statements justifying violence in the name of religion and the nation. Again, alienation is not significantly correlated with violent attitudes.

Table 6. Frustration and religious fundamentalism and ethnic nationalism

	(1) FUNDAMENTALISM	(2) NATIONALISM	(3) FUNDAMENTALISM	(4) NATIONALISM
Frustration	0.331** (0.146)	0.104 (0.131)	0.645*** (0.217)	0.196 (0.195)
Alienation	-0.102 (0.143)	-0.177 (0.130)	-0.009 (0.143)	-0.218* (0.128)
R-squared	0.013	0.006	0.112	0.139
Controls	No	No	Yes	YEs
N	433	456	433	453

Notes: The table reports point-estimates and standard errors of linear regressions of the indicated outcomes on the respondent's characteristics. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

To strengthen confidence in this finding, the above analysis was replicated using the Serbian sample. This exercise could be considered as a placebo test, given that religious fundamentalism had nothing to do with Kosovo Serbs' participation in the civil war in eastern Ukraine. As a result, no relationship should be observed between individual characteristics that are believed to be conducive to violence and Orthodox Christian fundamentalism. As expected, no evidence was found that frustration is associated with higher scores on religious fundamentalism among Serbian respondents. The correlation coefficient is close to zero and statically insignificant. This is in line with an observation that Christian fundamentalism does not typically correlate with extreme forms of violence, such as armed conflicts.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Koopmans, Ruud. 2015. "Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility against Out-Groups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (1): 33–57. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2014.935307>.